Why Cover-Ups and Scandals Keep Repeating — Three Lessons from a Major Accident That Apply to Small Work, Too
Hello, I’m Kurashiki Bouzu.
The result first. Whenever I see news of a major accident or a scandal inside a large organization, I find myself thinking, “Why does the same thing happen again?” The lessons of those events, boiled down, are three: put safety before everything else; share accurate information quickly; and keep education going. And from my own years of work, I would add a fourth, smaller lesson: a check is not a prayer that errors will not happen. Even when everyone works at 100%, human error still occurs — so you design your checks on that assumption, and layer them so the error never gets through.
This article is a transplant from my old site, “Yuyu Jiteki,” where I wrote about what can be learned from the accidents of the Japan Airlines (JAL) group.
An accident we must not forget
On August 12, 1985, Japan Airlines Flight 123 (Haneda to Itami) crashed into the Osutaka ridge in Ueno Village, Gunma. 520 people lost their lives. It remains the deadliest accident involving a single aircraft in the world.
I remember presenting on this accident in a social studies class when I was a child. The reporting went on day after day, and even as a child I understood how heavy it was.
The direct cause was the failure of the pressure bulkhead at the rear of the aircraft. That bulkhead had been repaired after a landing accident seven years earlier — and the investigation later found that the repair had been done incorrectly. The very place that was supposed to have been fixed had been weakening, little by little, over time.
It is a heavy example of how small breaches, piled one on another, end in an irreversible result. How repair records are kept. How safety management is organized. How information travels. If a single watching eye had worked at any one of those points, things might have stopped — that regret stays with this accident.
The lessons come down to three
What can be learned from major accidents comes down, I believe, to these three things.
- A culture that puts safety before everything — a rule, set at the core of the organization, that safety outranks efficiency and convenience
- Sharing accurate information, quickly — when information from the front line does not travel correctly, both the damage and the mistakes grow
- Keeping education going — the memory of an accident fades if left alone; it has to be handed down across generations through training
After the accident, JAL kept safety education for all its employees going for many years. The teaching: “I’m used to this, so it’s fine” and “this much is OK” are exactly the feelings that breed carelessness.
The symbol of that is the Safety Promotion Center opened at Haneda in 2006. Parts of the accident aircraft and belongings of the passengers are on display there, and it is still used for training new employees. About 95% of JAL’s current employees joined the company after the accident. Precisely because most of the staff never knew the accident firsthand, JAL kept a place where people learn in front of the real things. That, in itself, is the third lesson — keep education going — put into practice.
The same is true of small work
This is not only a story about big companies. It is the same in small work like mine, running a website.
- Prepare in advance — imagine the things that would be trouble if they happened (failures, attacks, information leaks) and decide the order of response beforehand
- Information accurate, and fast — when you notice a mistake, don’t sit on it; bring it out and fix it quickly
- Check twice — work done by human hands comes with mistakes; for the important places, use two sets of eyes
In my years in funeral work, what I was most careful about was preventing a mix-up of the deceased. The name. The documents. The place of rest. Not checking once and finishing, but having what was checked checked again by different eyes. “Checking the check.”
Why go that far? Because a check is not a wish that errors will not happen. Even working at 100%, human error occurs. Standing on the premise that it will occur, you layer checks in order to make sure it does not. A mix-up, once it has happened, cannot be undone. That is why you place watching eyes in layer after layer, to stop it before it happens. That was the way of thinking about checks that I learned on the job.
Funeral work also brought me into contact with police officers and officials. Depending on how a person died, I sometimes stood in on the taking of statements. What I felt then was this: the time for taking a statement is decided by the convenience of the side taking it. The police and officials come at a time that suits them. The side being called has no choice but to wait and match that time. Even when a family’s feelings are stretched to breaking point, the pace is set by the organization’s clock, and the front line being kept waiting is treated as a matter of course. Systems that handle information tend to run for the convenience of the side that made them and holds them.
And one more thing: an atmosphere where mistakes are easy to report. In a place where a mistake cannot be spoken of, small breaches grow larger without anyone noticing.
Here, too, JAL’s rule is instructive. In 2007, JAL became the first in Japan to decide that mistakes would not be subject to discipline, unless they were deliberate or negligent. Because there is no punishment, mistakes come to the surface quickly. An atmosphere where reporting is easy is not a matter of feelings — it is a matter of rules.
On this blog, when I fix a mistake in an article, I leave an honest record of it in the article’s history. That is my small practice of this lesson. Rather than hide it, show that it was fixed. That leaves material — for readers, and for myself — to avoid the same mistake next time.
Now I also manage the state of articles in a ledger, with the rule that checking is done by eyes other than the writer’s. A small operation’s own way of checking twice.
Safety first, accurate information, education that continues. Whatever the industry, I believe these three do not change.
- November 21, 2026 ― English version (ledger No. 1386; results-first rewrite of the Japanese article, ledger No. 63). Not yet published.(5,002 characters)
- November 21, 2026 ― Published (all 7 languages at once, on the user's instruction). Japanese original: ledger No. 63. New URL form with the Japanese ledger number at the end.(5,002 characters)
